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The now-large literature on ﬁscal competition has emphasized that subnational and na-
tional governments do not exist in isolation from the rest of the world but must compete
for mobile labor and capital. In what is by now the “benchmark case” for this literature,
the focus of attention is on the taxation of a single, mobile factor of production, often in-
terpreted as “capital”, by many individual governments in a system of jurisdictions. This
basic modeling structure has proven remarkably fruitful as it has been varied, extended,
and reinterpreted in many ways (see, e.g., Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004),
Wildasin (2006a), for surveys and many additional references.)1 The intellectual origins
of this literature, perhaps now occasionally forgotten, lie in the study of the incidence
of local property taxes the US and elsewhere. In what is still called the “new view” of
property tax incidence (see, e.g., Aaron (1975), Zodrow (2007)), building upon seminal
work by Mieszkowski (1972), the long-run incidence of local taxes in a closed system of
jurisdictions containing a ﬁxed aggregate supply of capital is shown to fall substantially
on the system-wide net return to capital. This system-wide perspective diﬀers from an
earlier tradition of analysis of the incidence of a property tax imposed by one single
locality within a larger ambient economy within which the net rate of return to capital
is determined. The taxation of capital by such a community, containing as it does only a
“small” fraction of the system-wide stock of capital, would have only a very small impact
on the economy-wide net rate of return on capital, and the “old view” of property tax
incidence in this context was that the incidence of the tax would fall on local landowners,
consumers, workers, or others whose welfare would be adversely aﬀected by changes in
the equilibrium prices of local non-traded goods (land rents, non-traded consumption
goods including housing, or wages).2
1It goes without saying that many studies have varied the “standard model” in ways that touch upon issues discussed
here. For instance, Wilson (1995) examines the problem of choosing multiple policy instruments, de Bartolome (1997)
studies the implications of gradual stock adjustment in response to local taxation, and Wildasin and Wilson (1996) study
ﬁscal competition in an overlapping generations model. Makris (2009) studies competition for mobile capital in a model
with endogenous savings. Becker and Rauscher (2007) examine an endogenous growth model with interjurisdictional capital
mobility where governments provide public inputs to ﬁrms.
2As noted in an important paper by Bradford (1978), even if a small locality’s tax on capital has a very small eﬀect on
the system-wide equilibrium net return to capital, this small eﬀect is spread over the system-wide stock of capital, and its
1More recently, this modeling approach has been applied to the analysis of corporation
income and other source-based taxes on capital income imposed not by small local gov-
ernments but by nations within the European Union or, indeed, by all nations in a
global context. It has also been applied to the analysis of decentralized taxation of labor,
whether imposed by local governments, those at the state/provincial level, or, indeed,
at the national level. It is directly applicable to the analysis of subsidies to labor and
capital, for instance in the context of regional development policy. With modiﬁcations,
it applies as well to the analysis of decentralized provision of public goods and inputs
in an open economy. Still, despite – or perhaps because – of the potentially very wide
applicability of the “open economy public economics” models, they do not necessarily
lend themselves readily to empirical and policy applications, for at least two reasons.
First, it is clearly essential to determine what factors of production are mobile, and
second, it is equally essential to determine over what geographical scope they are mo-
bile. When jurisdictions compete for capital investment, does this competition take
place within single metropolitan areas or within states (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra
(2001), Buettner (2001), among states within the US (e.g., Chirinko and Wilson (2007,
2008)), or among countries (e.g., Sorensen (2000, 2004), (Brochner et al. (2007), Dev-
ereux and Griﬃth (2002), Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002))? When they compete
for labor, does labor mobility extend to households within a metropolitan area (e.g.,
Tiebout (1956) and a vast subsequent literature), among school districts (e.g., Nechyba
(1999, 2000)), among households within a nation, or among households in the entire
world (Wildasin (2006b, 2008)? And does competition take place for all kinds of la-
bor and capital simultaneously, or only for some types, such as highly skilled workers
(e.g., Docquier and Rapoport (2008)), welfare recipients (e.g., Peterson and Rom (2000),
Brueckner (2003)), highly liquid ﬁnancial capital (e.g.,, Huizinga and Nicodeme (2004)),
manufacturing investment (Chirinko and Wilson (2007, 2008)), old people (Conway and
impact on the system-wide net return to capital is of the same order of magnitude – in some cases, is exactly equal to –
the amount of revenue collected by the locality. Thus, the general-equilibrium eﬀects of policies carried out even by very
small localities are not negligible, a ﬁnding with far-reaching implications for many aspects of policy analysis.
2Houtenville (2001)), or any other particular categories of capital or investment?
There may be no deﬁnitive answers to these questions, but it seems plausible that the
degree of mobility for diﬀerent types of factors of production – i.e, whether or not they are
mobile, and over what geographical scope – depends crucially on the time horizon of the
analysis. Whereas substantial global ﬂows of “hot money” make occur within a matter
of moments, major interregional population shifts seem to occur on time scales ranging
from decades to centuries. At the same time, it seems quite important to recognize
that factors of production tend to co-locate, presumably at least in substantial part
because of complementarities in the production process. For instance, the many buildings
and machines that make up major urban agglomerations also have large numbers of
people, and regions and nations that experience sustained immigration also generally
experience sustained net investment. These considerations suggest that the study of
ﬁscal competition should ultimately be grounded in an explicitly dynamic framework
in which more than one factor of production is potentially mobile. Of course, such an
approach raises diﬃcult analytical challenges. The goal of the present analysis is to
develop a dynamic model of a single open economy that utilizes two imperfectly mobile
factors of production – say, labor and capital. The dynamics of the model hinge on the
assumption that the inﬂow or outﬂow of labor and capital – i.e., migration and investment
ﬂows – entail costly adjustment, so that faster adjustment is always potentially possible,
but only at greater cost. The equilibrium dynamics imply that endogenously-determined
adjustments are not instantaneous.
A model with two imperfectly mobile factors of production permits a more sophisticated
approach to the study of many issues relating to ﬁscal competition than is true of a model
with only one mobile factor. In such a setting, ﬁscal policies that directly aﬀect one mobile
resource will also indirectly aﬀect the other mobile resource. As an illustration, suppose
that local taxes on capital are reduced, for instance in order to attract investment. If labor
is also a mobile resource, and if (in accordance with overwhelming empirical evidence)
3labor and capital are complements, reductions in capital taxation should raise the demand
for labor and contribute to an inﬂow of labor as well as capital. The speed with which
these factor co-movements take place is an important part of the allocative consequences
of policy changes in such an environment. For example, the output and employment
eﬀects of tax cuts for business investment will depend on whether the stock of labor
adjusts slowly or rapidly to policy-induced changes in the capital stock. Furthermore, the
incidence of such policies, that is, the extent to which diﬀerent factor owners are helped
or harmed by the policies, also depend crucially on the speed of factor adjustment. If
the stock of labor adjusts only slowly when business investment increases, workers in the
local labor force may enjoy better employment opportunities for a long time following
a cut in capital taxes, whereas any increase in their wages will quickly erode if workers
from elsewhere arrive quickly to take advantage of improved labor market conditions.
For these reasons, the study of the simultaneous dynamic adjustment of the stocks of
labor and capital in response to changes in ﬁscal policies that aﬀect either workers or
their employers is a matter of importance for policy evaluation as well as for the political
economy of policy determination. These implications are discussed more fully below.
To introduce notation and to establish a benchmark for future reference, the next sec-
tion of the paper presents a simple static model with two potentially mobile factors of
production, brieﬂy recapitulating known results. Section 3 extends this model to an
explicitly dynamic framework. The essential analytical tools used here were pioneered
by Boadway (1979) in the study of tax incidence in a closed economy, and have been
utilized in Wildasin (2003) in a dynamic model of ﬁscal competition with a single mobile
factor of production. Using these tools, comparative dynamic analysis shows how the
speed of transition in response to policy changes is determined through dynamic opti-
mizing behavior subject to adjustment costs. Because there are two mobile resources,
and because these resources are jointly utilized in the production process, a tax or sub-
sidy on one resource triggers simultaneous dynamic adjustment in the the amounts of
both. Section 4 provides quantitative illustrations of the ﬁrst-order dynamic incidence
4eﬀects of changes in capital and labor taxation. A comparison of the comparative dy-
namic incidence analysis of Sections 3 and 4 with the comparative statics analysis in
Section 2 reveals that ﬁscal incidence eﬀects can arise in a dynamic setting that have
no counterparts, and simply cannot be detected, in a static framework. In particular, in
the empirically relevant situation where labor and capital are complementary imperfectly
mobile factors of production, a tax (or subsidy) on either will depress (or raise) the gross
and net return to the other at all times subsequent to the initiation of the policy change.
These “transitory” cross eﬀects of ﬁscal policy diminish over time and disappear in the
long run since, just as in static models, the ultimate long-run incidence of the policy falls
on perfectly immobile factors. While the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the dynamic
analysis parallel results obtained in static models, transitional cross eﬀects, which arise
at any ﬁnite time after a change in policy, cannot arise in a standard static models of
ﬁscal competition and can only be observed in a dynamic framework.. The concluding
section summarizes brieﬂy and discusses further applications and directions for future
research.
2 Competition for Multiple Factors of Production in a Static
Setting
Consider a small open jurisdiction in which the production process uses one or more
completely immobile resources and a vector k of freely-mobile resources to produce either
a homogeneous num´ eraire commodity or, equivalently, many commodities that are freely
tradeable on external markets at exogenously-ﬁxed prices. Assuming constant returns
to scale with respect to all inputs, output, or the value of output, is a strictly concave
function f(k) of the variable inputs alone. Let τ be a vector of per-unit net ﬁscal burdens
imposed on the mobile resources; for resource ki, τi is the sum of all taxes imposed on
each unit, net of all cash and in-kind subsidies. The mobile resources are assumed to earn
exogenously-given net rates of return in the external market, denoted by the vector ρ. In
5equilibrium, the net return to each mobile resource located within the jurisdiction must
be equal to the external net rate of return, i.e., assuming competitive factor markets,
fk − τ = ρ. (1)
This system of equations determines the vector of equilibrium local employment of the







where Fij is the i,j cofactor of the Hessian matrix of second-order derivatives of the
production function f(k) and F is its determinant. By the strict concavity of f(k),
∂ki
∂τi < 0. In the absence of further restrictions on the production technology, the cross-
derivatives of ki with respect to other ﬁscal variables may be of any sign.
Note for future reference that, in the special case where fij = 0 ∀i,j, each ki depends
only on its own ﬁscal treatment τi and is independent of the policies applied to other
factors of production. As one illustration of such a case, suppose that there are several
types of freely-mobile labor that work in diﬀerent traded-goods sectors of the local econ-
omy, such as chemical engineers, automotive engineers, and aerospace engineers, each of
which combine with immobile, industry-speciﬁc capital to produce chemicals, cars, and
airplanes. In such a setting, changes in the number of each type of engineer would not
aﬀect the productivity of other types. Diﬀerences in the ﬁscal treatment of one type of
engineer, such as a tax break for workers in the automotive sector, would have no impact
on the demand for other types of workers or on the equilibrium levels of employment or
output in other sectors of the economy – that is, all cross-derivatives in (2) are zero. The
analysis of ﬁscal policy in this case can be decomposed, sector by sector, in such a way
that the local economy is simply a repeated version of an economy with a single mobile
factor of production, subject to a single local ﬁscal instrument.
More generally, cross-eﬀects arise when diﬀerent factors of production are complements
6or substitutes. For instance, many macroeconomic models postulate that production is
a CES (often Cobb-Douglas) function of labor and capital; in a spatial setting, such
production technologies can still be assumed provided that they are extended to take
account of the existence of at least one immobile factor of production such as land or
natural resources.3 Under such assumptions, mobile resources are typically complemen-
tary inputs, which implies that favorable ﬁscal treatment for one increases the equilibrium
employment of the others.
As an extreme case, if mobile resources are used in a Leontief or ﬁxed-proportions pro-
duction technology, every component of k must vary in the same proportion. Choosing




∂τj < 0 ∀i,j. In
this case, there is in eﬀect just one composite variable input whose ﬁscal treatment is the
composite of the net ﬁscal burdens imposed on each of the nominally distinct variable
inputs.
In all of these cases, ﬁscal burdens imposed on mobile factors of production have zero
(or very small) eﬀects on their net returns, which are determined in external markets.
From a political economy viewpoint, this means that the owners of mobile resources
have no incentive to inﬂuence the local political process, whereas the owners of immobile
resources do have such incentives. A standard result is that the optimal policy, from the
viewpoint of immobile factor owners, is to set the net ﬁscal burden on mobile resources
equal to zero if the set of ﬁscal instruments is suﬃciently rich.4
3If all factors of production are freely mobile and production takes place under constant returns to scale, the global
allocation of resources is indeterminate, and, starting from an equilibrium with nonzero output in the local economy, any
small change in ﬁscal policy could result in the departure of all factors of production and the complete collapse of the local
economy, a generally uninteresting case.
4School districts in the US historically depended very heavily on the local property tax as a source of ﬁnance, captured
in theoretical models such as Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) in the assumption that local taxes on capital are the sole
source of local government revenue. Under this assumed restriction on feasible ﬁscal instruments, immobile residents do
not drive the tax rate on freely-mobile capital to zero, since that would imply zero provision of local public goods.
73 Competition for Mobile Resources with Costly Dynamic Ad-
justment
3.1 A Dynamic Model
Following the outline of the static model spelled out above, suppose now that there are
adjustment costs associated with changes in the stocks of variable inputs, and that these
stocks change gradually over time in response to economic incentives. More precisely,
suppose that the value of output within a small open jurisdiction at time t depends on
the time-invariant stock of immobile resources and on the stocks of two mobile factors
of production, k1t and k2t, as given by the strictly concave function f(kt), where kt =
(k1t,k2t) is the vector of local stocks of the mobile inputs. Let fi(kt) > 0 denote the
value of the marginal product of variable factor i and let fij(kt) denote the cross-partial
derivatives of f(kt). The matrix [fij] is negative deﬁnite, i.e., fii < 0 < F ≡ |[fij]|.
Assuming that production takes place under conditions of constant returns to scale with
respect to all inputs, the marginal product of the immobile resource(s) is f(kt)−fk(kt)kt,
where fk(kt) is the vector of marginal products for the variable inputs.
In the present section, the two mobile factors of production are called “capital” (of types
1 and 2, respectively) as a matter of terminological and notational convenience, although
the choice of the letter k to denote each of the two mobile inputs is made for notational
economy, not to imply that both inputs must be literally be “capital”. The two inputs,
for instance, could just as well be diﬀerent types of labor. These inputs can be purchased
by local producers at prices that are taken as given by agents within a single small open
locality; given that these prices are determined in external markets, units of measurement
may be chosen so that one unit of each input has a price of unity. In the case where
input i is a capital good, it may be thought of as a non-consumption use of the all-
purpose num´ eraire commodity, as in standard macroeconomic and growth models. In
the case where input i is some type of labor, the ﬁxed price should be interpreted as the
8externally-given net wage rate for that type of labor. The normalized ﬁxed input prices,
set equal to unity here, correspond to the exogenously-determined vector ρ in the static
model of Section 2.
The stock of each input evolves over time according to
˙ kit = (git − δi)kit,i = 1,2 (3)
where git is the rate of “gross investment” and δi is a constant exponential rate of “de-
preciation.” These terms have their customary meaning when input i is capital. If input
i is some type of labor, however, git is more correctly described as a “net migration ﬂow”
and δit would be a constant exponential rate of “natural decrease.”
Producers in the local economy are perfectly competitive ﬁrms that maximize the present
value of proﬁts, discounted at the externally-given net rate of return on “ﬁnancial” capital
r.5 At each point in time, ﬁrms choose the level of employment of immobile resources
and the rates of investment for each type of capital. It is costly to adjust the stocks
of capital, with ci(git) denoting the cost of adjustment of capital of type i per unit of
capital; the adjustment cost functions are assumed to be nonnegative, strictly increasing,
and strictly convex in the rate of investment: c0
i(git) > 0 < c00
i(git) with ci(0) = 0.6
The cash ﬂow of a representative ﬁrm at time t is the value of its output, less its expen-
ditures on investment, less adjustment costs, less any net time invariant ﬁscal burdens
imposed on these stocks τ ≡ (τ1,τ2), less payments to the owners of immobile factors wt.
Fiscal policies are assumed to be time-invariant, which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis but
of course limits its scope as well.7
5The return r on “ﬁnancial” capital should be interpreted as an interest rate at which intertemporal trades can be made
on external markets. This is to be distinguished from the use of the num´ eraire commodity as a real capital input in the
local production process.
6This is a standard speciﬁcation in models of investment; see, e.g., Hayashi (1982). If input i is interpreted as a type
of labor, however, “adjustment costs” should be thought of as “migration costs”. If ﬁrms reimburse workers for the costs
of relocation, then ci(git) denotes the cost per unit of migration, expressed as an increasing and convex function of the
rate of migration. If workers must pay all of the migration costs, then ci(git) should be interpreted as a compensating
wage diﬀerential paid to workers to oﬀset their migration costs. If migration costs are split between ﬁrms and workers, the
adjustment cost function reﬂects the sum of migration costs paid by ﬁrms plus the compensating wage diﬀerential required
by migrating workers.
7The analysis of the time-invariant case is a useful precursor to more general cases, some of which are discussed in
Wildasin (2003). The present investigation abstracts from issues of time consistency and the evolution of policies over
9πt = f(k) −
X
i
(git + ci(git))kit − τkt − wt (4)






Necessary conditions for the maximization of Π subject to (3) can be expressed in terms
of the current value Hamiltonian
Ht ≡ πt +
X
i




= 0 ↔ λit = 1 + c
0
i(git) (7)
−˙ λit + rλit =
∂Ht
∂kit
↔ −˙ λit = fi(kt) − ci(git) + (λit − 1)git − τi − λit(r + δi) (8)
for i = 1,2.
Equation (7) determines git implicitly as a function of λit, φi(λit), satisfying φ0
i(λit) =
1/c00
i > 0. Substituting into (8) and deﬁning Ψi(λit) ≡ ci(φi[λit])−c0
i(φi[λit])φit(λit) yields
−˙ λit = fi(kt) − Ψi(λit) − τi − λit(r + δi) (9)
for i = 1,2. Note that Ψ0
i = −φic00
iφ0
i = −φi. Equations (3) and (9) form a 4-equation
dynamical system in the variables (kt,λt) with boundary conditions
ki0 = Ki0
limt→∞λit ≡ λi∞ = φ
−1
i (δi) (10)
time, though obviously these must be incorporated in a complete analysis (Kehoe (1989)).
10for i = 1,2 and with a unique steady state satisfying
gi∞ ≡ φi(λi∞) = δi (11)
fi(k∞) = Ψi(λi∞) + τi + λi∞(r + δi) (12)
where Ki0 denotes a ﬁxed initial stock of ki and where subscript ∞ denotes a steady-state
value.
3.2 Policy Impacts on Mobile Resources: Short Run, Long Run, and Tran-
sitional
In order to see how changes in ﬁscal policy aﬀect the equilibrium capital stocks, diﬀeren-
tiate equations (3) and (9) with respect to one of the policy instruments, τj, to obtain the
“variational equations” (see Boadway (1979) and the appendix for additional discussion)
d˙ kit
dτj




















where ∆ij is the Kronecker delta and where fik = (fi1,fi2).
The solution of these equations is simpliﬁed by assuming that the system is initially in
a steady-state equilibrium, conditional on some initially-given policies (τ1,τ2) – that is,
given these policies, the stocks of both mobile inputs have fully adjusted to their “long
run” levels at which ﬁrms set each git such that ˙ kit = 0 for i = 1,2.8 The steady-state
assumption means this system of four ﬁrst-order linear diﬀerential equations in dλt/dτj
and dkt/dτj has constant coeﬃcients. In a steady state, Ψ0











8This is the dynamic analog to the standard assumption, used in comparative statics analyses of models like those in
Section 2, that the system is initially in a static equilibrium that is then perturbed by a policy change, producing (2).










Using (15) and (16), terms in (14) involving λit can be eliminated to produce a system
of two second-order diﬀerential equations in the variables dkit/dτj.
This system must satisfy the boundary conditions
∂ki0
∂τj













,i,j = 1,2,i 6= j, (17)
where ∂ki∞/∂τj ≡ limt→∞∂kit/∂τj. The ﬁrst of these reﬂects given initial stocks of
inputs, and the second is obtained from equations (12).
The boundary conditions describe the short-run and long-run eﬀects of changes in ﬁscal
policy on the amounts of mobile factors of production employed in the local economy:
Proposition 1: (a) An increase in the net tax burden on any mobile resource decreases
its long-run equilibrium level, i.e., ∂ki∞/∂τi < 0;
(b) an increase in the net tax burden on a mobile resource reduces the long-run equilib-
rium level of the other mobile factor if the two inputs are complements in the production
process, but increases the equilibrium level if they are substitutes, i.e., sgn(∂ki∞/∂τj) =
- sgn(fji) for i 6= j.
(c) the long-run comparative-dynamic responses of mobile resources to changes in ﬁscal
policies depend only on the properties of the production technology and are not (directly)
aﬀected by adjustment costs.
The results in (17) are identical in form to those obtained in the static model of Section
2, as shown in (2). In particular, the properties of the adjustment cost technology do
not aﬀect the comparative steady-state eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.9 The dynamic model thus
9To be clear, this is only true of the form of the results that appear in (2) and (17).
12encompasses, at its extremes, a “short-run” in which no resources are mobile and a “long-
run” in which equilibrium stocks of mobile resources adjust exactly as predicted in the
static model.
While it is important to understand the short and long run eﬀects of policy changes,
much of the important impact of policy – in fact, the entire impact, other than the most
transitory eﬀects and the eﬀects that are only realized asymptotically – occurs during
the transition from the short to the long run.
This transition, and in particular the equilibrium speed of adjustment, depends on the






































Concavity of the production function and convexity of the adjustment cost functions
imply that (i) b1 > r2 and b2 > 0, so that b1 +2
√
b2 > r2, and (ii) b1 −2
√
b2 > 0. Hence,
all roots are real, with two positive and two negative roots.
The boundary conditions imply that only terms involving the negative roots appear

























































































To interpret these results, note ﬁrst that the expression 1−(eγ1t +eγ2t)/2 appears in the
leading terms in each equation. At t = 0, this expression is equal to 0, and it approaches
1 as t → ∞. The expression eγ1t −eγ2t appears in the trailing terms in (21) and (22) and
is 0 at t = 0. Because γ1 < γ2 < 0, it is negative for all t > 0 and approaches zero as
t → ∞. These remarks verify that the solutions satisfy the boundary conditions (17). In
economic terms, this means that the key results from the static model of Section 2 are
conﬁrmed in the long run.
In the special case where fij = 0, changes in the stock of one factor have no eﬀect on
the productivity of the other factor; in eﬀect, each factor of production is speciﬁc to
a diﬀerent sector. Intuitively, a tax on one factor should have no eﬀect on the other
in this special case, whether temporarily or in the long run. This is conﬁrmed by (22)
since the multiplicative term corresponding to the boundary condition is zero. Detailed





















in this special case, conﬁrming that the response of the taxed factor depends on its own
adjustment cost and on the elasticity of demand for this factor alone and not on the
10The computation and veriﬁcation of these solutions are in principle straightforward but involve many detailed cal-
culations. Perhaps most important and least obvious are the derivations that allow for the signing and ordering of the
characteristic roots. These details, omitted here for brevity, are available to interested readers on request.
14corresponding terms for the other factor. In eﬀect, the analysis reduces in this case to
the case of a single mobile factor already analyzed elsewhere (Wildasin (2003)).
In the general case where fij 6= 0, however, the above solutions show that the adjustment
of the two factor stocks is interdependent, both during the transition to a new steady
state and in the long run, as expected. The roots γi determine the speed of adjustment
of the mobile factors and, as shown in (18)– (20), these depend on the convexity of the
adjustment cost functions. If the c00
i terms are small, the roots are large in absolute
value, which means that the speed of adjustment of the system is rapid. The intuition
is straightforward: if high rates of adjustment are not much more costly (at the margin)
than low rates, there is little incentive to defer adjustment to policy changes. On the
other hand, if (marginal) adjustment costs rise steeply as the rate of adjustment increases,
there is a signiﬁcant cost savings to be realized by adjusting factor stocks slowly. Because
both roots enter into the solutions (21) and (22), the speed of adjustment of each variable
input depends not only on its own adjustment cost technology, but on the adjustment
costs for the other input: the two are interdependent, as again should be expected.
3.3 The Dynamic Incidence of Taxes on Mobile Factors
Because (21) and (22) spell out the comparative dynamic response of equilibrium factor
stocks to changes in tax policy, they can be used to determine the responses of all other
variables in the system that depend on these stocks. Of particular interest from a public
ﬁnance perspective is the dynamic incidence of tax policy. In the long run, the net returns
to both of the mobile factors of production are unaﬀected by changes in local tax policy,
since both factors must eventually earn the unchanged external net rate of return. The
gross factor prices for both factors depend on their stocks, however, both in the short and
the long run, and, at the moment that a tax change takes place, these stocks are ﬁxed. An
increase in the tax on factor i therefore immediately reduces the net return to this factor
by the amount of the tax, i.e., the short-run incidence of a tax on an imperfectly mobile
15factor falls entirely on that factor. Because factor stocks cannot adjust instantaneously to
changes in policy, the gross and net returns to the other imperfectly mobile factor j and
to the completely immobile factors are initially unaﬀected by an increased tax on factor i.
In the short run, in other words, there is no shifting of the tax on the imperfectly mobile
taxed factor, even though the entire burden of the tax can only fall on the completely
immobile factor of production in the long run (ignoring, that is, the small but not zero
eﬀect of local taxes on external factor prices, ` a la Bradford (1978)).
The incidence of the tax during the transition to a new steady state depends on whether
factors i and j are complements, substitutes, or independents in production. In the latter
case, the return to factor j is completely unaﬀected by a change in taxation on factor i
in the short run, during the transition to the new steady state, and in the long run. If
the two factors are complements, an increased tax on factor i triggers an initial reduction
in the gross and net return to that factor, giving rise to a reduction of the stock of that
factor that gradually raises its gross and net return back to their long-run values. During
this transition, the burden of the tax on factor i is partially shifted to factor j, even
though there is no initial eﬀect nor any long run eﬀect. If factors i and j are substitutes
(fij < 0), then an increase in the tax on i raises the gross and net return to factor j
during the transition to a new steady state.
A static analysis of the type presented in Section 2 shows that a tax on a mobile factor
of production falls entirely on that factor in the short run (i.e., before factor stocks can
adjust to the tax) and that the tax is entirely shifted to the completely immobile factor of
production in the long run, with no eﬀect on other factors of production either in the short
or the long runs. The preceding comparative dynamic analysis conﬁrms these results,
but it also shows that increased taxation of one imperfectly mobile factor of production
imposes a burden on a complementary imperfectly mobile factor of production during
the transition to a new steady state and that it confers a beneﬁt to such a factor if it is
a substitute in production for the taxed factor. These eﬀects cannot be discerned in a
16comparative static analysis such as that of Section 2.
4 Illustrative Calculations
A limitation of the analysis presented above, like that of standard tax incidence analyses
based on comparative statics calculations (e.g., in the tradition of the Harberger model),
is that it only shows the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of a change in tax policy. Computable general
equilibrium (CGE) analyses overcome this limitation by postulating explicit forms for
production functions and other elements of the model, making it possible to compute
explicitly the impacts of discrete policy changes on equilibrium values of relevant vari-
ables. As against this advantage of CGE modeling, of course, the validity of the assumed
function forms, not only as local approximations but over discrete ranges, is always open
to question. Analysis of the ﬁrst-order impacts of policy changes thus complements the
analysis of discrete changes via CGE models.
Similar consideration apply in dynamic analysis. With explicit speciﬁcations of functional
forms for production and adjustment cost functions, it would be possible to calculate
dynamic general equilibria for the model presented above and thus to calculate explicitly
the dynamic impact of discrete policy changes. The preceding analysis, on the other hand,
provides ﬁrst-order approximations to the eﬀects of policy changes without imposing
assumptions about functional forms.
It is also possible to combine these two approaches by imposing speciﬁc functional forms
which are assumed to be locally valid; with information about parameter values, it is
then possible to calculate the ﬁrst-order impacts of policy changes. This approach is
still limited to ﬁrst-order approximations, i.e., to rates of change in response to policy
changes rather than to calculation of discretely diﬀerent equilibrium paths for discretely
diﬀerent policies. On the other hand, it does not require that the postulated functional
forms be valid over wide ranges, possibly beyond the range of empirical observation.
17To illustrate this approach, and to provide some sense of the quantitative implications
of the comparative dynamic responses to ﬁscal policy changes, let us assume that the
production function is locally well approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function of the
immobile factor and of the two imperfectly mobile factors such as capital and labor.
Within the context of the model, capital and labor may be distinguished by their shares
in the value of production, which are assumed to be 0.2 and 0.6 resp., implying a factor
share for the immobile factors – call them “land”, in aggregate – of 0.2. In calculating
the solutions (21) and (22) numerically, it is convenient to assume ki∞ = 1 for i = 1,2.
The choice of an interest rate r amounts essentially to the choice of unit of time; r = 0.03
is a reasonable value for an annual interest rate.
Once relevant parameter values are speciﬁed, it is possible to calculate numerically the
values of the derivatives in (21) and (22). Details of these calculations are omitted
to save space, but they show that increased ﬁscal burdens on either capital or labor
trigger reductions in both, as expected given that they are complements. The speeds
of adjustment of these stocks of course depend on the adjustment cost parameters, and
in the expected directions. If the values c00
1 = 5 and c00
2 = 1 are assumed, most of the
response to changes in the ﬁscal treatment of capital and labor occurs within the ﬁrst
half-decade of a policy change; in the absence of established empirical estimates for such
parameters, these are taken as plausible baseline values.
Although factor stock adjustments are of fundamental importance in the model, the
impact of taxes on factor prices is of greater economic interest. Denoting the gross
returns to capital and labor by Rt and Wt respectively, and letting capital be factor 1,














showing clearly that the time path of returns to each factor depends on the time-varying











Given the assumed parameter values, these expressions can be calculated numerically
using (21) and (22).
Figure 1 plots the comparative dynamic response of factor prices to an increase in the
ﬁscal burden on capital for the baseline parameter values speciﬁed above. This ﬁgure
shows clearly that the gross factor price of capital rises unit-for-unit with the tax in the
long run, asymptotically approaching 1, so that the net return to capital is unaﬀected.
This adjustment is far from instantaneous, however, with the net return to capital re-
covering halfway to its externally-ﬁxed long run equilibrium level after about 5 years.
Similarly, the return to land is diminished in the long run by the tax on capital, but this
adjustment also takes a comparably long time to be substantially complete. Of particular
note, the ﬁgure shows that a higher ﬁscal burden on capital depresses the gross (and net)
return to labor for as long as a decade after the policy change, an eﬀect that disappears
in the long run. Although this eﬀect is modest, it illustrates the potential importance of
transitional cross-eﬀects of the type that, as noted above, cannot occur in static models.
The magnitude of this cross eﬀect depends on the assumed factor shares of labor and
capital, as well as on the size of their adjustment cost parameters, as the next ﬁgures
show.
Figure 2 shows the eﬀects on factor prices over time resulting from an increase in the
ﬁscal burden on labor, retaining the baseline values for all parameters. Once again, the
taxed factor (labor) suﬀers a reduction in net return that persists for some years, though
in this case the return to the long-run level is much faster because of the assumed lower
cost of adjustment for labor. Land rents also adjust more quickly in this case. The
cross eﬀect on the return to capital is more marked, partly because labor’s factor share
is greater than that of capital. This eﬀect is still fairly persistent, despite the relatively
rapid change in the stock of labor, because of the assumed high adjustment costs for
19capital.
As a ﬁnal illustration, Figure 3 varies the parameters from those assumed in Figure 1 by
assuming that labor is much slower to adjust – corresponding to a value of its adjustment
cost parameter equal to 55. In this case, a higher ﬁscal burden on capital depresses the
wage signiﬁcantly for a very long period, implying that much of the incidence of capital
taxes falls on labor. Because labor is so slow to adjust, the fall in land rents is very much
delayed, and indeed wages fall proportionally more than land rents for many of the early
years after the policy change. This case might be viewed as illustrative of a situation
where labor is “trapped” in a region by very high (to be more precise, by rapidly-rising)
migration costs; in this case, labor becomes very similar to a second immobile factor of
production for a signiﬁcant period of time, even though it remains perfectly mobile in
the long run – now measured in decades.
Many variations on these calculations can be made, and computer animations allow one
to visualize the eﬀects of changes in parameter values on the equilibrium adjustment
paths of factor stocks and factor prices. Remaining with the framework of Cobb-Douglas
production technologies, experimentation with diﬀerent parameter values serves mainly
to conﬁrm economic common sense, as the underlying model is very neoclassical in nature.
The ﬁnding of greatest importance, central to exploitation of dynamic rather than static
modeling, is already illustrated by a comparison of Figures 1 and 3: factors with nearly-
linear adjustment cost functions respond very quickly to changes in ﬁscal treatment, while
highly convex adjustment cost functions lead to protracted adjustments. The explicit
modeling of adjustment costs thus permits empirically meaningful distinctions to be
drawn between “highly mobile” and “highly immobile” factors of production. The model
demonstrates that the owners of relatively or completely immobile factors of production
cannot gain much, in a ﬁscal incidence sense, from imposing ﬁscal burdens on highly
mobile resources, a result that has obvious predictive implications regarding equilibrium
ﬁscal structures in open economies. Clearly, there remain many avenues for useful further
20analysis, perhaps calibrated to more general production technologies (e.g., CES) and to
particular policy scenarios.
5 Conclusion
To summarize, the preceding analysis has shown how local ﬁscal policy, applied to one
of two imperfectly mobile factors of production, aﬀects the dynamic equilibrium allo-
cation of both. The system adjusts gradually to a long-run equilibrium, with eﬀects
on equilibrium allocations that depend on the local production technology, including
complementarity or substitutability of the mobile factors. The speed with which this
adjustment occurs, for each of the two factors of production, depends on the costs of
adjustment for both.
Since gross factor prices are determined by factor supplies, the dynamic impacts of ﬁscal
policy on the returns to local mobile and immobile factors are readily determined from
the time paths of factor stocks. For example, an increase in the tax on one factor has
no immediate impact on factor allocations and thus no immediate impact on the gross
return to any factor of production. The net return to the more heavily taxed factor thus
initially falls by the amount of the increase in tax, while net returns to other factors
are unaﬀected. In the long run, the gross return to the more heavily taxed factor rises
suﬃciently to restore its net return to its externally-given value. The impacts of the
higher tax on gross and net returns to the other mobile resource and to the immobile
factor(s) depend upon complement/substitute relationships in production. If one of the
mobile factors is capital and the other is labor, the two factors are complementary inputs
according to empirical studies. In this case, a tax on one input is partially shifted to the
other during the transition to a new steady-state equilibrium, a transitional impact that
has no counterpart in static equilibrium models.
If the process of adjustment to higher taxes is slow, the net return to the more heavily-
21taxed factor, as well as to a complementary factor, can be substantially depressed for a
long period of time. If instead this process is fast, the net return quickly approaches the
externally-determined level. There may then be equally rapid impacts on the amount of
the other mobile resource and on the gross and net returns to it and to the immobile
factor.
There are many potential applications and extensions of this analysis, of which only a
few are mentioned for the sake of brevity.
First, because transition periods can be of substantial duration, analyses that focus only
on very long eﬀects of policy changes omit important considerations. In static models of
the type presented in section 2, taxes on mobile resources can only harm the interests of
immobile factor owners. If the proceeds of a tax on imperfectly mobile capital or labor
are paid to immobile factor owners, however, it is quite possible for them to beneﬁt, in
present value terms, even though they are harmed in the long run. For instance, a tax
on capital may be borne substantially by capital and labor, and only to a slight degree
by immobile factor owners, for a period of 5-10 years. The “short run” gains may well
outweigh the long run harm, for reasonable discount rates. Indeed, one can show that
the interests of immobile factor owners are best served by introducing at least a small
positive tax rate on mobile factors of production, as has been previously shown in the
single-factor case (Wildasin 2003).
Second, from the perspective of political economy, note that the owners of imperfectly
mobile factors have incentives to inﬂuence local policies even though these policies can
have no eﬀect on net factor returns in the long run. This is essentially a corollary of
the preceding remark, as the gains to immobile factor owners from taxes on imperfectly
mobile resources are achieved at the expense of the owners of “trapped” factors of pro-
duction that can only escape in the long run. Participation and intensity of interest in
the local political process depend on speeds of adjustment in response to policies, with
many combinations of “voice” and “exit” (see Hirschman 1970) possible depending on
22production and adjustment cost technologies.
Third, from an economic development viewpoint, dynamic analysis is clearly crucial to an
understanding of the time frame over which tax incentives or other development policies
can be expected to work. The preceding analysis has demonstrated the interdependent
dynamic responses of each of two mobile resources to the ﬁscal treatment of either of them.
As an illustration, the analysis has shed light on how, when and to what degree more
favorable ﬁscal treatment of imperfectly mobile business capital may beneﬁt workers.
Similar analyses could be undertaken to explore other policies, such as ﬁscal preferences
for high-skilled workers and their impact on investment in non-human capital or on the
demand for low-skilled workers.
Fourth, the analysis identiﬁes important empirical parameters that inﬂuence the dynamic
impacts of tax policies. These include adjustment cost functions for potentially mobile
factors of production. Studies such as those of Decressin and Fatas (1995), who estimate
that interregional labor force adjustments in Europe occur at about half the speed of
similar adjustments in the US, can assist in determining the proper speciﬁcation and
parameterization of such functions. Comparatively few empirical analyses have been
directed to such questions to date, but there is scope for fruitful application of the
ﬁndings of future investigations of this type.
Finally, it is worth recalling that simultaneous ﬂows of labor and capital have accom-
panied the development of important economic regions over widely varying time scales.
Authors such as Hatton and Williamson (1994) have documented the long-term ﬂows
of labor and capital from the Old World to the New World and their important ef-
fects on output, factor prices, and the distribution of income in both regions during the
nineteenth century. Migration by skilled workers has been estimated by Barrett et al.
(2002)) to have had large impacts on economic growth and the distribution of income
in the Irish economy prior to the recent economic downturn. The twentieth century in
the US has witnessed South/North (early-mid century), East/West (century-long), Rust
23Belt/Sun Belt (latter decades), and rural/urban (century-long) ﬂows of labor and capital
among major regions. The growth and decline of particular agglomerations, such as New
York, Detroit, St. Louis, or Atlanta are records of simultaneous ﬂows of both labor and
capital. These dynamic adjustment processes are ongoing and reﬂect underlying com-
plementarities in production and the resulting partial synchronization of migration and
investment ﬂows. Exactly how the costs of labor and capital stock adjustment interact
to produce observed ﬂows has not so far been investigated empirically, but this simul-
taneous adjustment process, stemming ultimately from production complementarities,
must also give rise to “policy complementarities” in which, for example, the provision of
local educational services and local tax policies aﬀect the attractiveness of a region for
workers and for complementary investments in non-human capital, and the tax treat-
ment of local business and the provision of public infrastructure aﬀect the proﬁtability
of business investment and the employment conditions for local workers. Comparative
dynamic analysis can provide a framework with which to explore such issues.
24Appendix: The Method of Variational Equations
This appendix provides a concise informal discussion of variational equations. It draws
upon Hartman (1964, Theorem 3.1, pp. 95-96). See also Boadway (1979).
Suppose that the evolution of a vector x(t) is described by the system
˙ x = f(x(t),θ) (A.1)
where θ is some parameter of the system. A solution to this system is a vector ξ(t,θ),
depending on time t and on the parameter θ. An equilibrium (equivalently, rest point
or steady state) is a vector x∗ such that f(x∗,θ) = 0. For present purposes, existence of
a “well-behaved” solution to (A.1) is assumed for some value of θ and for some relevant
initial conditions. Speciﬁcally, suﬃcient smoothness and convergence of a solution to an
equilibrium is assumed.
The problem of interest is to understand the dependence of the solution ξ(t,θ) on the
parameter θ. A ﬁrst-order approximation of the rate of change of the solution with
respect to the parameter is given by the partial derivative ∂ξ(t,θ)/∂θ which, in general,
is time-varying. Since ξ(t,θ) satisﬁes (A.1) for all values of θ,
˙ ξ(t,θ) ≡ f(ξ(t,θ),θ). (A.2)







where fx and fθ denote partial derivatives of f with respect to x and θ, resp.
Assuming that the system (A.1) is initially in equilibrium, i.e., ˙ x(t) = 0 and x(t) = x∗,
25(A.3) can be written as system of linear diﬀerential equations with constant coeﬃcients,
˙ y = fx(x
∗,θ)y + fθ(x
∗,θ) (A.4)
where, for notational convenience, y(t,θ) denotes ∂ξ(t,θ)/∂θ. Such systems can be solved
explicitly for y(t), the time-varying rate of change of the solution of the system (A.1)
with respect to the parameter θ.
In the analysis of Section 3, the state of the system depends on the capital stock k(t)
and on the shadow value of capital. Diﬀerentiation of equations (3) and (9) produces
a system of two ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations (13) and (14) in kt and λt which, with
some manipulation and standard relabeling, can be equivalently expressed as a system
of two second-order diﬀerential equations in kt alone, as described in the text. When
evaluated at a steady state, this system has constant coeﬃcients and is (relatively) easily
solved.
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